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ABSTRACT 
Krenz, Claudia, M.A., December 1980 Interpersonal Communication 
The Role of Quantification in Scientific Communication: Differential 
Responses by Lay and Scientist Subjects (77 pp.) 
Director: Wesley N. Shellen > 
The purpose of this study was to establish whether there are 
differences between lay and scientist subjects in l) their evalua­
tion of the scientificity of written messages with different kinds 
of quantification and 2) in the categories or qualities which sub­
jects generate to illustrate differences between scientific and 
non-scientific communication. A subsidiary purpose was to dis­
cover whether scientist and lay subjects' predispositions favorable 
to solving a problem identified in a written message were influ­
enced by the presence or absence of numbers. 
The subject population consisted of forty-five lay and forty-five 
scientist subjects who read a message about acid rain and responded 
to a questionnaire, which included scaled items pertaining to the 
scientificity of the message, the credibility of the message source, 
the solvability of the problem, knowledge of rules for scientific 
decisionmaking and willingness to share information. The question­
naire also included one open-ended question pertaining to concepts 
illustrative of differences between scientific and non-scientific 
communication. 
The largest source of significant differences in the study was 
differences between lay and scientist subjects. Specifically, 
scientists were more apt to l) disagree that the message was scien­
tifically stated and to doubt the message source's credentials; 
2) evaluate the irrelevant numbers message more negatively; 3) be 
more confident in their knowledge of the rules for scientific 
decisionmaking; *0 think that acid rain was a significant problem 
and a solvable problem; 5) generate more concepts illustrative 
of differences between scientific and non-scientific communication; 
and 6) generate more words illustrative of the process of doing 
science. In the latter case, lay subjects generated about equal 
numbers of words illustrative of the process of doing science and 
of the product or scientific message. For both subject populations, 
however, science was regarded as "accurate, true, and right." 
Other conclusions were that scales intended to measure scientificity 
did intercorrelate highly and that quantification did not affect 
perceptions of problem solvability, sourco credibility, and scien-
tificity. Finally, there were no differences between scientist and 
lay subjects on the willingness-to-share-information scale. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Scientific communication, and its role in the actual doing of 
science, has been scrutinized by researchers and scholars in a variety 
of disciplines. Much effort has been devoted to attempts to discover 
the nature of scientific .knowledge. Little effort has been devoted 
to establishing categories or qualities which scientists and lay-
people use to conceptualize science. The specific purpose of this 
study is to establish whether there are differences between lay and 
scientist subjects in l) their reponse to different kinds of quantif­
ication in written messages and 2) in the categories or qualities 
which they generate to illustrate differences between scientific and 
nonscientific communication. A subsidiary purpose is to discover 
whether scientist and lay subjects' predispositions toward solving a 
problem identified in a written message are influenced by the presence 
or absence of numbers. This chapter contains a statement of the problem 
and a statement of the research questions. 
Statement of th^ Problem 
Background: What is Science? 
There is no consensus on the nature of science. What a physicist 
does when she does science is different from what a sociologist does 
when she does science. In part, of course, the doing of science 
in physics and sociology differ because the domain of inquiry is 
different. In part, however, the doing of science in physics and 
and sociology differ because different disciplines have different 
ideas of science. To take an example from one discipline, psych­
ology, Fodor (1972) noted that the behaviorist idea of science had 
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focused the discipline's practitioners on a domain of problems which 
could only be legitimately addressed by "theories" which contained 
the fewest possible non-observation, terms and which explicitly opera-
tionalized the few such terms they did have. In part then the behavior 
of a discipline and its practitioners exemplifies ideas and findings 
about the behavior of scientists and the nature of science that the 
discipline has developed (Merton, 1972). 
There are, of course, those who contend that much, if not all, 
of the social sciences are not science, but to enter the thickets of the 
discussions on the question of the validity and nature of scientific 
knowledge is not the purpose of the present study. 
To emphasize this point, we could say that individuals, as well 
as individual disciplines and professions, have an idea of what 
constitutes an "acceptable scientific story." Using the word "story" 
rather than "message" is useful here in the sense that acceptable 
story encompasses more substantive issues (like what constitutes 
acceptable problem-solving methods) than does "acceptable message," 
which tends to encourage the reader to think along the lines of format 
characteristics. Further, "acceptable story" serves to remind the 
reader that contemporary scholars do not view scientific knowledge 
as, necessarily, scientific truth. 
V/hat is of interest to the present study is the various dimensions 
along which people and disciplines tend to view science and scientific 
communication. The following perspectjves are relevant to the present 
study: l) the views of science that different scientists in different 
disciplines adhere to and propound; 2) the views of science that are 
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characteristic of so-called lay people; and 3) the views of science 
emerging from the scholarship of those philosophers and historians of 
science and socisil scientists who take the study of science as their 
domain of inquiry. 
Before examining those views, it would be useful to emphasize 
the following point: Science is not a singular monolithic sort of 
entity. Rather than there being a science per se, there is science-^, 
science2» science^, only "various autonomous domains of inquiry 
(which) develop epistemic criteria that often are widely divergent and 
potentially conflicting" (Holzner and Marx, 1979» P- 212). These 
"autonomous domains" do not always, perhaps not even usually, get along. 
As controversies between the disciplines which take science as their 
domain of inquiry suggest, there is a tendency to devalue the 
scholarly output of other disciplines. Even the mere sharing of 
information with those outside the discipline is contrary to tradition­
al professional roles and to the peer reward system (Lopata, 1976; 
Pullen and Fraser, 1975)-
Grounded in the kind of science practiced by their individual, 
disciplines, it is not surprising that scholars who study science 
disagree over how (and by whom) science should be investigated. 
Sociologists Holzner and Marx (1979), for example, are careful to 
point out that their view differs significantly "from the treatment 
of scientific disciplines and professions merely in terms of...map­
ping communication links" which, they state, can make "important but 
limited contributions" (p. 168). Since much of psychologist Garvey's 
work has been devoted to mapping those links, he doubtless would 
disagree. Philosopher Daudan (1977), on the other hand, castigates 
the sociologists for using scientific arguments as data when they 
have no understanding of what those arguments are about. Social scientists 
are sometimes accused of "doing the history of science without a 
license (Griffith, 1979, p- 383)* However, in response to the philos­
ophers, information scientist Griffith pleads with the philosophers 
of science to look at the data. 
Despite interdisciplinary contentiousness, disciplines are 
becoming increasingly homogenized by the tasks their practitioners 
engage in. Garvey (1979) speaks of the research scientist who flits 
back and forth between basic research and technology. Holzner and 
Marx (1979) note that 
There is some evidence...various activities...largely in­
dependent of each other are coming into closer... communi­
cation with each other. As a result, it is often difficult 
to distinguish between activities labeled basic research, 
applied research, technology, and production/utilization 
(p. 31). 
Perhaps more importantly, however, scientist/professionals are 
united by 
an aim toward...a standard of scientificity, the principles 
of w^ich are believed to be universal.... the frames of 
reference, reality tests, and rules for evidence from... 
divergent fields are reasonably systematic, describable and 
embedded in a broader scientific conception of truth which 
does enable them to be translated into each other....a 
broad conception of science serves as an ideal standard 
of truth (p. 212). 
Put another way, the divergent disciplines are united by the fact that 
they have epistemic criteria. 
From Holzner and Marx's social construction of reality per­
spective, epistemic criteria also function to establish a common frame 
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of reference, which provides all practitioners with a consensually 
validated perspective for the doing of science. That intradisciplin-
ary communication systems are jealously guarded closed systems would 
tend to reinforce the discipline's epistemic criteria and its idea 
of a good science story—as well as make it stronger than that for 
laypersons. 
This is not, of course, to say that there is total consensus within 
disciplines. Psychologist Harlow, for example, said that the behavior-
ist notion of science had focused researchers on a set of problems the 
importance of which had "decreased as a negatively accelerated function 
approaching an asymtote of complete indifference." A discipline then 
is a fuzzy-edged group of individuals united by both a more-or-less 
common domain of inquiry and a more-or-less common idea about proper 
scientific procedures. 
But practicing scientists are not the only ones with ideas about 
the nature of science. Laypeople, too, have ideas of good science 
stories. Kuhn (1961) argues that both laypeople (and would-be 
scientists) gain their first and sometimes last exposure to science 
through textbooks. Since texts are designed to propagate the current 
truths of a discipline and are ahistorical, they do not give their 
readers an idea of how science is actually done, how scientific 
progress is achieved. "There is a textbook image of science," 
Kuhn observed, "and it may be systematically misleading" (1961, p. 
162). Textbooks' disregard for refute^ theory, coupled with their 
tendency to include only those numerical tobies that confirm the theory 
the text is advancing, might be responsible for the common equation 
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of scientific knowledge with scientific truth. Certainly, such a mis­
conception is common. So is the view that "science produces technology 
which, in turn produces wars, pollution and stimulates the wealthy, 
the western and the capitalistic to live beyond the world's means" 
(Griffith, 1979» PP« 382-83). The remainder of this section will 
examine some of the views of science advanced by the disciplines who 
study her-
Philosophy and History of Science Perspective 
Views of science advanced by historians and philosophers of 
science are particularly germane to the present study because of the 
seemingly widespread diffusion of a particular philosophy of science, 
logical positivism/empiricism. In response, for example, to what he 
regarded as problematic in the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum 
physics, Feyerabend wrote 
that the fight for tolerance in scientific matters and the 
fight for scientific progress must still be carried on. 
What has changed is the denominations of the enemies.... 
Today they call themselves...logical empiricists(1963»p»5)• 
Whatever the implications for the growth of knowledge, the logical 
empiricist view of science does seem a common one, in the social as 
well as the physical sciences. In psychology, for example, the logical 
empiricist view of science was "imported, with undisguised gratitude, 
from the philosophy of science...some three decades ago...Psychology 
is thus in the unenviable position of standing on philosophical founda­
tions which began to be vacated by philosophy almost as soon as the 
former had borrowed them "(Koch, 196^, p. 5). And there are sociologists 
who regard themselves as social or billiard ball physicists. 
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Two characteristics of the logical empiricist tradition seem 
worth emphasizing. First, these empiricists were ahistorical in their 
approach to science. Their pronouncements were not based on descrip­
tions of how science was practiced in the world. Rather, their aim 
was to establish deductive certainty for empirical knowledge. Second, 
the empiricists were almost exclusively concerned with establishing 
scientific progress as a logical (in the formal sense of that word) 
endeavor whose conclusions were certainti.es. Scientific knowledge 
was absolutely grounded in the, as it were, bedrock of experience. 
Characteristically, the logical empiricists believed both in the 
possibility of the logical reconstruction of scientific discovery and 
theory change and in explicitly and logically defining theoretical 
terms. 
Although the logical empiricists claimed to have established 
this logical basis for science, a gradually increasing pattern of 
anomalies led to consensus on its sterility amongst philosophers of 
science, although not amongst the general public and many practicing 
scientists, as the examples from psychology and physics illustrate. 
Some anomalies resulted from the empiricist assertion that theoretical 
terms could be precisely defined. Attempts to define theoretical 
terms (including Hussell'fi explicit definitions, Bridgeman's opera­
tional definitions, and ^arnap's reduction sentences and correspondence 
rules) failed. Craig's and Winnie's theorems in mathematics, which 
convinced the empiricists that for any theory consisting solely 
of theoretical and observational terms you could both eliminate the 
theoretical terms and change their meanings without changing the validity 
8 
of the theory,were a further embarasscent. Other anomalies, which 
stemmed from the empiricists' misplaced faith in the non-modal symbolic 
logic of IVincipia Mathematica, included being able to confirm a 
theory like "all ravens are black" with an observation; like "seeing 
a yellow pencil." In retrospect, the empiricists' attempts to make 
science logical were either too rigid, gutting science's ability to 
predict and generalize, or too loose, allowing nonsense statements 
into the corpus of scientific knowledge. 
To overcome the problem of confirmation via induction, which the 
empiricists asserted they had solved but never did, Sir Karl Popper, 
in his early writings, contended that if we could not confirm theories, 
then we could at least falsify or disconfirm them. Popper reasoned 
that if a given theory predicts a certain observational consequence, 
failure to obtain that consequence would disconfirm or falsify the 
theory via the modus tollens principle of deductive logic. 
Here then was certainty for science. Duhem and Quine, however, 
pointed out that theories are always tested in conjunction with 
numerous background assumptions (e.g., about the efficacy of a par­
ticular operational definition). We could, of course, have good 
inductive reasons to assume that background assumptions were not 
responsible for the observational consequence—but that lets "whiffs 
of induction" into Popper's model. Since theories or hypotheses 
obtained inductively are uncertain, scientific knowledge is left 
foundationless. 
It was the empiricists' inability to solve the problem of induction 
that led Popper, and others, to conclude that scientific knowledge is 
foundationless. As a foil to the widely diffused empiricist model of 
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science, it would be useful to examine ideas of science developed in 
the contemporary history and philosophy of science. Witchcraft, said 
Feyerabend, is as grounded in experience as is physics (1963), an 
assertion all the more disturbing in that physics seems to be everyone's 
paradigm of science. Perception is theory laden, argued Norwood Hanson: 
observation and empirical statements, like a meter, respond to the 
world, but how they are interpreted depends on the meter reader-
Although the debate over the certainty of scientific knowledge is far 
from over, there is now more emphasis en describing the doing of science 
than on logically reconstructing it. Hie logical empiricists were 
ahistorical, but the contemporary philosophy of science is not. 
Kuhn (1970), whose views are representative of the newer school 
in the history and philosophy of science, argued that the old empiricist 
tradition was not supported by the record from the history of science, 
particularly physics, which seems the only discipline intensively 
studied by philosophers and historians of science. In Kuhn's view, 
science—at least in paradigmed disciplines like physics—progresses 
not steadily but through alternating cycles of normal and revolutionary 
science. formal science is a problem- or puzzle-solving activity and, 
as such, guarantees thab an answer is available,restricts methods for 
answering, and specifies what constitutes acceptable solutions. 
During periods of normal science, the theories are extended and made 
more precise, undetermined facts are discovered, and the paradigm 
itself is articulated, its ambiguities increasingly resolved and its 
applications extended. When science erters a crisis period, what is 
challenged is its mode of adjudication. There are no formulas to tell 
when to give up a theory or paradigm. An emerging—and sustained— 
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pattern of anomalies or instances where observational outcomes are 
not in accord with theoretical predictions triggers theoretical 
and paradigm change in science. Although some critics have accused 
Kuhn of taking the view that theory change in science is totally a 
function of mob psychology, without benefit of any rules for adjud­
ication, they are in the minority- Science is more commonly regarded 
as at least a rational enterprise. 
Disciplines have paradigms which more-or-less articulate the 
discipline's ideas about science.(Social sciences can also be thought 
to have paradigms, albeit very diluted and diffused ones.) The 
notion of "paradigm" is not, however, clearly defined in Kuhn. One 
critic, for example, pointed out that Kuhn used "paradigm" twelve 
different ways in the Structures. 
Still, from the overall Kuhnian perspective, an emergent view 
is that the discipline's stories influence what and how the discipline 
researches. Within this process view, logical empiricism could 
be cast as an example of a specific kind of story, one which is still 
prevalent amongst scientists and, consequently, exerts some influence 
on the doing of contemporary science. Whether such science stories 
introduce rigor and serve to advance scientific knowledge or whether, 
as Feyerabend (19&3) argued, they are dogmatic metaphysical systems 
whose adoption imperils the growth of knowledge, is another issue. 
Social Scientific Perspective 
Instead of focusing on nonobservable stories or paradigms, the 
majority of social scientists who study science focus primarily on 
observables. 
In addition to its being a knowledge-producing activity, science is 
also a social activity. "Science," wrote sociologist Zuckerman, "is 
not well organized or well articulated. People are jealous and do not 
necessarily get along with one another. To expect anything other than this 
is to be uncritically optimistic"(l970»P-3l)•Another factor contributing 
to the relativity of scientific knowledge is the lack of mechanical pro­
cedures for applying criteria for adjudication to specific problems. In 
one empirical study of referee behavior, pscyhologist Garvey (1979) found 
that while referees showed a great deal of agreement as to what good 
scientific articles should be like, they showed only chance-level agreement 
when it came to assessing the merits of individual articles. The rela­
tivity of knowledge is also indicated by information science studies of 
citation behavior, which indicate, for example, that journal articles have 
a useful "half life" during which time they are cited and after which they 
are forgotten. Ait to describe the essence of a domain on inquiry as 
"relative" is not sufficient. 
Communication, scholars like Garvey, Meadows(197*+) > and Ziman(l968) 
argue, is the essence of contemporary science. Certainly, when speaking 
of science and scientific communication, it is necessary to distinguish past 
from present. Holzner and Marx (1979) link the origins of science with 
"cultural free spaces," in which otherwise effective restraints and author­
itative strictures are at least partially suspended. Now, however, scholars 
like Feyerabend (1963) argue that science (at least the Copenhagen inter­
pretation of quantum physics) is on its way to becoming what, it ostensibly 
abhors, a dogmatic metaphysical system. Whatever the implications for 
the growth of knowledge, science's transformation from a cottage 
industry to a social activity has increasing meant that its infor­
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mation is public information (Ziman, 1968). Publication is the 
way to establish priority of discovery—which is the route to reward, 
to success within the discipline—and to disseminate and have verified 
one's discoveries. 
Communication has always been an important part of science. In 1610, 
for example, Galileo wrote ^epler a letter which contained the following 
anagram: smaismrmilmepoetalevmibunenugttaviras, which, unscrambled, said 
altissimum pal entam tergeminum observari, and, translated said,"I have 
seen the uppermost planet triple," referring, of course, t-'o Galileo's 
discovery of Saturn's rings (Meadows, 197^) • Contemporary scientists 
use the more-efficient journals rather than obscure anagrams to establish 
priorities. The communication channels in science have evolved to better 
meet scientist's needs and the increasingly interactive nature of science 
(Garvey, 1979). 
Despite cross-disciplinary differences in scientists' problem-solving 
criteria, scientists in all disciplines exhibit many similar communication 
behaviors. For one thing, they are resistant to attempts to change their 
closed system of communication. Velikovsky's ideas, for example, were 
presented outside the formal communication system, and so many scientists 
condemmed them on an a. priori basis, without even reading his books. 
Journal publication, which represents a method of storytelling to 
which most laypeople are never exposed,is of central importance in a 
discipline's formal communication network. Of course, on the research 
front of a discipline, interpersonal communication is a more important 
source of relevant information: by the time articles are printed in 
journals, the research front is addressing different problems. And 
13 
at the early stages of problem solution, when critical feedback on 
design and research questions is important, the informal or inter­
personal networks are crucial. 
Another indicator of the importance of communication to science is 
c.ensorship incidents. «^e need not turn as far back as Galileo for an 
example. When he was editor of the only specialized statistical 
journal at the time, Pearson regularly refused to publish articles 
written by Fisher, whose philosophy of statistics differed from his 
own (Meadows, 197^ ). And there is the apocryphal tale of rationalist 
Noam Chomskey's threatening to resign if the behaviorally oriented 
Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Eehavior persisted in its 
refusal to publish Fodor's article attacking (and some would say 
demolishing) O.H. Mowrer's behavioral language-acquisition theory. 
Soviet biologist Lysenko went further than 'suppressing publication 
of dissident articles in the journal which he edited: he had the 
leaders of the opposition arrested. 
Communication is also essential in the process whereby individual 
practitioners in a discipline learn those ideas about the behavior of 
science and scientists that have been developed by the discipline, 
would-be scientists learn about their disciplines by learning how their 
disciplines communicate, and it is upon the discipline's communication 
system that the would-be scientist's subsequent survival depends 
(Garvey, 1979)-
In part, of course, students learn about specific facts and 
theories, about the current accomplishments and achievements of their 
discipline. But they also learn met^ ideas like what their disciplines 
conceive of as interesting problems and acceptable means of solution. 
In the terminology of this inquiry, they learn the ingredients of 
what their disciplines consider to be good science stories. 
Much of this latter kind of knowledge Kuhn (1970) calls "tacit 
knowledge." These unwritten behavioral norms are learned by example 
or by exemplars, not by rules. Other scholars would call this process 
socialization. 
However they learn, would be scientists learn the norms of their 
disciplines. Merton (1957) delineated the four central institu­
tional imperatives of science as universalism (objective and impersonal 
canons of truth), communism (public information), disinterestedness 
(subordination of individual motives to institutional norms), and 
organized skepticism (continous scrutiny of assertions in terms of 
logical or empirical criteria). Cooperation within disciplines seems 
more the norm than cooperation between disciplines. Other norms, 
identified by Chase,(1978) are pertinence to current research, logical 
rigor, precision, theoretical significance, and the use of mathematics. 
Given the view of scientific knowledge as factual knowledge, it would 
seem reasonable to add precise, logical, objective and causality as 
additional characterisitcs of "good" science stories. 
Measurement and duantification as Norm^ in Science 
Certainly, we have seen that disciplines have a variety of norms 
or tacit rules that pertain to their ideas of good science stories. 
One apparently interdisciplinary norm seems to be using measurement 
(using procedures that always produce actual numbers). The operational 
indicator of the hardness—and thus the prestige—of a discipline is 
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the extent to which it uses mathematics (Chase, 1978). 
Numbers—what Storer called "the superficial trappings of quanti­
fication" (I970i P- 132)—certainly abound in journal articles. There 
are, not surprisingly, some cross-disciplinary differences. Meadows 
(1978), for example, noted that while social science journals have 
fewer numerical results than do physical science journals, they 
nevertheless have almost as many experimentally controlled numbers. 
To take an example from another discipline, one of the issues 
raised in communication journal articles questioning the assumptions 
of the field pertains to the role of measurement. Fisher (1977) noted 
that "to require that all research evidence be composed of numbers and all 
analyses be statistical is no more valid than to require a rule-conforming 
theory" (p. l8). Delia and Grossberg(1977) also observed that all too 
often communication theories reflect researchers' mathematical assumptions 
more than the meaningfulness of the social world. Scheidel (1977) noted 
that while ^ehrabian intended some qualification of his .07-.38-.55 
formula (which predicts the amount of liking that is attributable to 
verbal, vocal, and facial codes), "bald faced citations" of the formula 
are common in the literature, thereby giving the formula more precision 
than is warranted. Scheidel attributed this kind of blindness to 
accepting, without question, the assertions of authorities. An alternative 
explanation would be that the numbers themselves lend an aura of precision. 
It would almost seem that the practical meaning for social scientists 
of Lord Keivin s famous dictum—"If you cannot measure, your knowledge is 
meager and unsatisfactory"—is that suggested by Kuhn (l96l):"lf you 
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cannot measure, measure anyhow." This is not, of course, to say 
that social science journals contain useless numbers but physical science 
journals do not. Writing about a literature search aimed at extracting 
a data base of interatomic energy functions, Boyle et al. (1977, cited 
by Meadows, 1978, p. 51) wrote, "To our surprise we found that, in more 
than 80?o of the cases, those who have published potential data have 
failed to provide estimates of the accuracy....Thus, often the published 
data is (sic) worthless." 
Some scholars have speculated on possible reasons for the preval­
ence of useless numbers. Kuhn (1961), for example, pointed out 
that measurement has not been the route to success in the physical 
sciences, although textbooks give the mistaken notion that measuring is 
the route to success. Kuhn argues that numerical tables in text­
books are useful only insofar as they provide an exemplar for 
"reasonable agreement" between theoretical prediction and observational 
outcomes: 
Scientific practice exhibits no consistently applied or consis­
tently applicable external criterion. "Reasonable agreement" 
varies from one part of science to another, and within any part of 
science it varies with time. What to Ptolemy and his immediate 
successors was reasonable agreement between astronomical theory and 
observation was to ^opernicus incisive evidence that the Ptolemaic 
system must be wrong. Between the times of °avendish (1731-1810) 
and ^amsay (1852-1916), a similar change in accepted chemical 
criteria for "reasonable agreement" led to the study of the noble 
gases. hese divergences are typical and they are matched by those 
between contemporary branches of the scientific community. In parts 
of spectroscopy "reasonable agreement" means agreement in the 
first six or eight left-hand digits in the numbers of a table of 
wave lengths. In the theory of solids, by contrast, two-place 
agreement is often considered very good indeed. Yet there are 
certain parts of astronomy in which any search for even so limited 
an agreement must seem Utopian. In the theoretical study of stellar 
magnitudes, agreement to a multiplicative factor of ten is often 
taken to be "reasonable" (p. 166). 
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Kuhn argued that numerical tables in textbooks are useful solely for the 
purpose of determining "reasonable agreement," because they record the 
outcomes of specific discovery and confirmation procedures and because 
"the route from theory or law to measurement can almost never be travelled 
backwards" (p. 175)• Kuhn cautioned would-be scientists and philosophers 
that texts may be the right place for philosophers to discover 
the logical structure of finished scientific theories, they are 
more likely to mislead than to help the unwary individual who 
asks about productive methods.... texts teach how to read lit­
erature, not how to create or evaluate it. What signposts they 
supply to these latter points are most likely to point in the 
wrong direction (p. 167). 
Productive methods, Kuhn argued, are almost always initially qualitative. 
Without this necessary initial qualitative work, "numbers gathered without 
some knowledge of the regularity to be expected almost never speak for 
themselves. Almost certainly they remain just numbers" (p. 175)-
Although Kuhn noted that the signposts supplied in the textbooks 
"point in the wrong direction," the journal articles seem to do no better. 
Weigert (1970) argued that sociologists use statistical tests in a ritual 
manner in order to get their articles past the gatekeepers or journal 
referees. Storer speculated that the prevalence of numbers "rray stem 
partly from the desire to emulate the harder, more established disciplines 
(1970, p.132 ). Other writers have attributed this condition to the 
worship of statistics: 
Scientific method has been to develop methods of defining external 
criteria which transcend individual judgment alone and which can 
be applied to a variety of factual difficulties. The contemporary 
biomedical and behavior scientist is like a skilled lawyer in 
a j^y peers, searching out acceptable ways to obtain and 
evaluate the suitability and respectability of evidence. The rules 
of evidence are random selection of subjects, the use of control 
groups, large sample si^es, operational definition of variables, 
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and statistical analysis of the data. The desire to achieve 
"objective evidence" has sprung so loose from its roots that this 
last component has come to supercede and overshadow all the 
various rules of evidence, acting on its own as a court of final 
and complete appeal. After all, what could be more objective 
than a set of numbers? (Schulman, Kupst, and Suran, 1977i P-39). 
Since science wants only to acquire clean, clear ideas, numbers are par­
ticularly prized. 
To summarize, Kuhn's history of science approach argued that for the 
physical sciences, measuring was not the route to progress. We Can assume 
this to be true of the social sciences as well. However, in both the 
physical and the social sciences, other researchers indicate that journal 
articles are peppered with numbers, some of them useless. Kuhn argued that 
textbooks mislead philosophers of science about the function of measure­
ment. ^t would seem that they have also misled scientists. Kuhn 
was incorrect when stating that journals show the real and useful function 
of measurement in science. 
The numbers in the journals may, however, say something about science 
in the world, about how science is done—or about norms for scientific 
stories. 
The following question then arises: Are scientific messages somehow 
perceived as more scientific, as telling a better science story, when they 
have numbers in them? This question could be asked of lay as well as 
scientific populations. N0 one has asked it of either. 
Experimental Studies on the Effects of Measurement 
For lay populations, messages with numbers in them (on general 
topics like capital punishment, legalized gambling, and school boards) 
have been shown to increase attitude change and source credibility. 
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Messages with numbers (on scientific topics) have also, for lay subjects, 
been shown to increase reading time and to decrease comprehension (although 
these results were not significant), and to decrease predisposition to 
solving problems. 
That part of the attitude change literature concerned with evidence 
usage indicates that messages with numerals educe significantly more attitude 
change than do messages without them. In all the studies cited in this 
section, messages with evidence were operationalized as messages with 
numbers. The following operational definitions °f the levels of evidence 
employed by Kline (197*0 are illustrative: 
Specific evidence: Of the college freshmen who rank in the bottom 
half on entrance examinations, only 35^ will make it through the 
entire four years. However, of those in the top half of the enter­
ing freshman classes, 85/° will graduate from college. 
Nonspecific evidence: Of the college freshmen who rank low on 
entrance examinations, many will not make it through the entire 
four years. However, of those who rank high the greatest share 
will graduate from college. 
No evidence* It appears that students who rank low in the entering 
freshmen classes do not stand as good a chance to make it through 
the entire four years as those who rank high (p. ̂ +08). 
In. a situation where subjects were asked to express their degree of 
agreement or of disagreement to written messages on different topics 
(legalized gambling, admissions requirements, and accelerated programs), 
Kline found that subjects reading messages with numbers (specific evidence) 
changed opinion significantly more in the direction advocated by the message 
than did subjects who read messages without numbers (nonspecific and no 
evidence). The only exception occurred for low intelligence subjects 
reading messages on statements of fact: while not showing significant 
differences, such subjects did favor messages with numbers. Further, for 
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both kinds of messages, expertness and trustworthiness scores of the 
unidentified messages writers varied in the same direction that type of 
evidence varied. 
McCroskey's (1967) operationalization of evidence (in messages about 
capital punishment and school boards) was similar to Kline's: "23.8/6 
of the nation's school boards include people who are not even high school 
graduates" was generalized to "many school boards in the United States 
include people who are not even high school graduates" (pp. 191-92). Unlike 
Kline, however, McCroskey's numbered messages also contained source attributions 
and their qualifications. McCroskey found that messages with numbers were 
significantly more effective in producing attitude shifts than those 
which included no numbers. McCroskey also found that significantly higher 
scores on authoritativeness resulted from the numbered messages and that 
the "caliber of evidence" was also rated significantly higher. While McCroskey 
did not include intelligence as a variable, he did find that GPA did not 
correlate significantly with his dependent variables. 
To extend the attitude-change literature to counterpersuasion, 
McCroskey (1970) operationalized evidence in the same way he had in 
preceding studies, with "56^" being substituted for "a majority." 
This study showed both a significant interaction between credibility and 
messages with numbers and, further, that numbered messages tended to 
serve as inhibitors of counterpersuasion. McCroskey and Dunham (1966) 
also reported an interaction between messages with numbers and initial 
credibility, with the numbered messages being significantly more 
effective under conditions of low credibility. 
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Finally, of particular relevance to the present study is a study 
which investigated the effect of quantification (measurement) on 
predispositions about solving problems posed in a 200-word message 
(Witt, 1976). In this study, Witt controlled readability and varied 
quantification in written messages presented to university students. 
Subjects received one of two messages, one containing twelve quantifiers 
(e.g., "80% nitrogen") and the other containing twelve pseudo quan­
tifiers (e.g., "mostly nitrogen"). For a dependent measure, Witt 
used a list of 30 favorable, unfavorable, and neutral words randomly 
arranged. Predisposition favorable to finding solution was measured by 
the frequency of favorable words selected. Using mean number of 
favorable words selected, Witt found that quantification (measurement) 
significantly reduced favorability. Perhaps, he speculated, because 
it gave subjects too much information. It is not clear, however, 
whether Witt's results reflect an effect for relevant measurement 
or for mere measurement. Also, looking at only favorable scales is a 
minor methodological problem. Testing only lay subjects has further 
limited the generality of Witt's study. 
In summary then, numbers are seen to be an important message 
variable in scientific journal writing. r^he history of science 
indicates that numbers have not furthered scientific progress in the 
long run; current-day scholars in a variety of disciplines indicate 
this is also true for current problem-solving activities. Kuhn's 
notion of exemplars provides something to an answer to "why numbers?" 
Certainly, for contemporary scientists, journals reinforce the associa­
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tion of numbers with science; they themselves can be thought of as 
exemplars, as models of scientific communication. Numbers also 
increased attitude change, source credibility and decreased predis­
position to solving problems for lay subjects. Whether these effects 
stem from the mere presence of the numbers or are associated with 
the specificity of the evidence is not, however, clear. Nor is it 
clear whether these effects are limited to lay populations. 
Research Questions 
The present study is intended to remedy the following two short­
comings identified in the literature; l) Whether it is the mere 
presence of numbers that makes messages seem more scientific and 
decreases predisposition to finding solutions. 2) Whether scientists 
and lay subjects differ in their respo^ijes to quantification and 
whether they conceptualize science differently. Further, unlike most 
studies on scientific communication (Hiltz, 1978), it will be 
experimental rather than correlational. 
In the present study, the experimental variable will be three 
messages that are identical except in the method of quantification 
employed: one will have no numbers; a second will have numbers that 
are relevant to the issue; and a third will contain useless numbers 
that contribute nothing to the understanding of the problem. The 
second or correlational variable in the present study will be the 
comparison of lay and scientist subjects. One of the dependent measures 
in the present study will test whether messages with numbers are per­
ceived as more scientific by both lay and scientist subjects. '•'•he 
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other dependent measure—the JP favorable, unfavorable, and neutral 
words used by Wj_tt—will test predisposition to finding solution for both 
lay and scientist subjects. 
The qualitative portion of the study will examine those categories 
which lay and scientist subjects seem to use to conceptualize science 
and scientific communication. 
It is hypothesized that 
1) Scientist and lay subjects will perceive messages with numbers 
as havinr greater scientificity than messages without numbers. Messages 
with numbers will be perceived as more precise, more logical, more 
scientific, more explanatory, more objective, as containing more as 
well as more relevant evidence, as well as establishing a causal link 
and containing technical-journal like evidence. Given the prevalence 
of useless numbers in scientific writing, this hypothesis will probably 
be true for both relevant and irrelevant numbers. 
2) Message version will affect lay <-md scientist snb.jects* predisposition 
favorable to findin/r solution. Certainly, Witt's study indicates that 
for lay subjects, measurement decreases favorable predisposition. 
For scientist subjects, however, one might expect the opposite, given 
the prevalence of numbers in scientific communication. 
3) Subjects' perceptions of the authoritativeness of the message 
source will be affected by the presence or absence of numbers in the 
messages but their perceptions of the trustworthiness of the message 
source will not be so affected. 
k) Scientist subjects will have stronger opinions about science 
than will lay subjects. Scientists will both feel more confident in 
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their knowledge of scientific decision making than will lay subjects, 
and they will generate more words illustrative of differences between 
scientific and nonscientific communication than will lay subjects. 
5) Scientist subjects will be less willing to disseminate infor­
mation than will lay subjects. Social science research indicates that 
while communication within the discipline is essential to the doing of 
science, communication outside the discipline is regarded as either 
unimportant or as a violation of disciplinary standards. 
Definitions 
"Levels of measurement": The relevant numbers message version will 
contain numbers with some bearing on the problem while the irrelevant 
numbers version will contain numbers %ith no bearing on the problem. 
The no numbers message version will, o/ course, have no numbers. The 
relevant numbers version will be operationalized by statements like 
"Some rainfall has a pH as low as 3*0i about that of lemon juice" while 
the other messages will contain statements like, "Some rainfall has a 
pH as low as lemon juice." The irrelevant numbers version will be 
operationalized by statements like "Eastern 1/2 of the United States...." 
while the other message versions will contain statements like 
"Eastern part of the United States...." 
"Scientist" will, for the present study, be taken to include both 
basic research scientists as well as professionals in engineering. 
"Predisposition toward solution": As mentioned previously, it 
is not clear whether Witt's differences did in fact reflect jxredis-
position favorable to finding solution. To replicate the Witt study, 
the same 30 words will be used. In addition, two qualitative questions 
will be asked to help determine what is being measured, whether it is 




Subjects included b^> professionals in scientific fields (scientists) 
and a comparison group of b^> laypersons (nonsc'.entists). Scientist 
subjects were recruited from professionals working for the U.S. 
Geological Survey and from the Idaho Nuclear Engineering Laboratory. 
Lay subjects were sampled from introductory courses in Interpersonal 
Communication. Potential subjects were approached by the researcher's 
confederates, told about the study, what their role would consist of 
should they choose to participate, and asked if they would be willing 
to participate. Demographic data are summarized in Appendix B. 
Materials 
Three versions of a 200-word science message (one without numbers, 
one with twelve irrelevant numbers, and one with twelve relevant 
numbers) were developed from an environmental impact analysis of the 
problem of acid rain. 
The dependent variable consisted of sets of scales following the 
message. They included a set of agree-disagree scales intended to 
measure message scientificity, the 30 words used by Witt to measure 
predisposition toward solving the problems presented in the message, 
one open-ended qualitative question that pertained to subjects' per­
ceptions of science, and a set of demographic questions. 
A message on an environmental issue was selected partly to 
extend the generality of Witt's study ar>i partly to allow the resecU'eher 
to generalize to environmental problems. Acid rain was selected as 
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the specific message topic, because it is a contemporary issue but 
is not as controversial as, say, the nuclear power question. Further, 
this topic was one that was amenable to all three message versions. 
Procedure 
Messages and scales were prepared in booklet form. Booklets 
were randomized and then distributed to subjects by the researcher's 
confederates on a first-come first-serve basis. To eliminate the 
threat of history to the design's internal validity, data collection 
was coordinated in time among all subjects as much as possible. 
Statistics 
Hypotheses were tested using a 2 by 3 randomized block design 
(13 subjects/cell). The independent variables were the threee 
different message types and the two kinds of subjects, scientist 
and lay-
For hypothesis one, which pertained to perceived scientificity, 
a two-way analysis of variance between lay and scientist subjects and 
between the three different message versions was computed on the 
nine scaled dependent measures: precision of problem statement, 
adequacy of factual ovidence, logicalness of problem statement, 
whether the message explains the problem, whether it contains technical-
journal like evidence, whether the message states the problem objec­
tively, whether it establishes a causal link, whether its presents 
relevant evidence, and whether it states the problem in a scientific 
way. 
For hypothesis two, which pertained to perceived problem 
solvability, the researcher, like Witt, computed the mean number of 
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favorable responses selected from Witt's initial words/condition 
and then computed a two-way analysis of variance between subjects and 
between message versions. To control for errors introduced by 
variations in the amount of words subjects tend to underline, the 
researcher also computed the ratio of favorable/unfavorable responses/ 
message version or condition and then computed a two-way analysis 
of variance between subjects and message versions. 
For hypothesis three, which pertained to perceptions of credi­
bility, the researcher computed a two-way analysis of variance 
between subjects and message versions for the two scaled statements 
on the authoritativeness and trustworthiness of the message source. 
For hypothesis four, which pertained to knowledge of scientific 
procedures, the researcher computed a- two-way analysis of variance 
between subjects for the scaled items on knowledge of the rules for 
scientific decision making and for the number of concepts listed 
in response to the open-ended qualitative question. 
For hypothesis five, which pertained to willingness to share 
information, the researcher computed a two-way anaJysis of variance 
between subjects for the scaled item pertaining to willingness to 
share information with those outside your discipline. 
Two judges familiar with qualitative methodology inductively 
determined categories for the open-ended qualitative question. After 
completion of this task, the Cohen Coefficient of Agreement was com­
puted as a measure of inter-judge reliability. 
CHAPTER III 
RESULTS 
Results of the statistical analysis the data collected in the 
experiment are presented in this chapter- -'•he analyses included a 
two-way analysis of variance (between lay versus scientist subjects and 
between the three message versions) for the scales used to indicate 
perceived scientificity; for the words and scales used to indicate 
perceived problem solvability; for the scales used to determine the 
credibility of the message source; for the scales used to assess 
knowledge of scientific decision making and the number of concepts 
generated to illustrate scientific communication; and for the scale 
used to determine willingness to share information. 
Perceived Scientificity 
The results of the analysis of variance of the nine dependent 
measures designed to measure scientificity showed significant main 
effects(without interactions) between lay and scientist subjects 
along the following qualities: adequacy of evidence (F^ g^= 5«01; p <.05), 
scientif icness of problem statement (F^ g^=l8.97i P<«05), and 
whether it contained technical-journal like evidence (F^ g^=l8.02;p <.0^). 
As shown in Table 2, the lay subjects tended to have no opinion 
about the amount of evidence and to disagree somewhat about the 
scientificness of the problem statement. Along both categories, 
the scientists tended to disagree: the message did not contain enough 
evidence and it did not state the problem very scientifically. 
As shown in Table 3, significant differences between belief in the 
scientificness of the problem statement and whether it contained 
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technical-journal like evidence explained about 15 percent of the 
2 variance (Eta = .15) whereas differences between lay and scientist 
subjects' opinions about the adequacy of the evidence only accounted 
2 
for 5 percent of the variance (Eta =.05). 
Results of the analysis of variance indicated only one signif­
icant main effect among the nine dependent measures for message type. 
That is, the subjects exposed tc the various message types differed in 
opinion about whether the message contained technical-journal like 
evidence (F^ g^=4.6^; p <.05). Scheffe contrasts revealed that the 
only significant difference here was between the relevant numbers and 
the other two versions of the message, with all subjects agreeing 
significantly more that the relevant numbers message was more like 
a technical-journal article than the other message versions. However, 
as Table 3 shows, this difference only explained. .3 percent of the 
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variance in the experiment (Eta =.03). 
Results of the analysis of variance of the nine dependent scales 
indicate significant disordinal interactions for the following 
qualities: precision (F^ £^=3.19; p<.05), explanation (F^ ̂ =6.J>b; 
p<.05), and causality (F^ g^=3.72; p<.05). Scheffe Critical 
Differences, listed in Table 2, show that for all three qualities, 
the interaction is attributable solely to differential responses 
to the irrelevant numbers version of the message. Lay subjects tended 
to have no opinion about the precision of the message and whether it 
explained the problem but tended to agree that it did establish a 
causal link. Scientists disagreed wvth all three statements about the 
message. Uiat is, they did not think tn^ message very precise, did 
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not think that it explained the problem, and did not think it established 
a causal link. These interactions, shown in Figure 1, mean, that 
the main effects for precision and causality cannot be discussed. 
No significant main effects or interactions were found between 
ratings of the following characteristics: logicality, relevance of 
evidence, and objectivity. 
Perceived Problem Solvability 
Results of the analysis of variance of the four dependent 
rreasures that pertained to perceived problem solvability showed 
significant differences only on the scaled ratings of the 
solvability of the problem(F^ g^=11.77> p<.05). As shown in Table 
2 scientists thought the problem was mor<_ solvable than did the lay 
subjects. Since this is a main effect, it cannot, of course, be 
attributed to the message versions. It is interesting to note 
that scientists were also significantly more sure that acid rain 
was a problem (F^ g^=3^«02; p <.05) than were lay subjects. This 
difference explained almost 30 percent of the variance in the scale 
ratings (Eta^=-.28). 
Results were insignificant for both the number of favorable 
words selected and the ratio of favorable to unfavorable words 
selected. In other words, Witt's study was not replicated. 
Perceived Credibility of the Message Source 
Results of the analysis of variance of the two scaled statements 
about the authoritativeness and trustworthiness of the message source 
were significant(F^ g^=9.73; p < .05 and F1 g^=8.27; p<.05). Again, 
these were simple main effects between scientist and lay subjects, with 
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the scientists tending to doubt the credibility of the message source 
more than did lay subjects. As shown in Table 3» these significant 
differences both explain about 10 percent of the variance in the 
2 
respective scale ratings (Eta =.10 and .0C). 
Confidence in Knowledge of Scientific Decisionmaking 
Results of the analysis of variance of the three dependent measures 
(two scaled questions and the number of concepts generated to illustrate 
differences between scientific and nonscientific communication) 
showed significant differences as follows: for knowing the rules 
for scientific decisionmaking (F^ g^=33*75; p<«05); for knowing 
them because applying them is part of my current job (F^ g^=20.03; 
p <. 05) ; and for number of concepts generated (F^ gJi+=5»08; p<.05). 
For the scaled questions pertaining to knowledge of procedures, lay 
subjects tended to disagree that they knew the rules whereas scientist 
subjects tended to agree that they know the rules but to have 
no opinion about whether the only reason they knew them was because it 
was part of their job. Scientists subjects generated significantly 
more concepts descriptive of scientific communication than did lay 
subjects. As shown in Table 3i the ,ercent of variance explained 
for the knowing-the-rules question was aLout percent (Eta "=.28); 
for the knowing-the-rules-because-it-is-v~rt-of-my —job question, it 
p 
was about 20 percent (Eta "=.19); and for the number of concepts 
2 generated, it was less than 10 percent ( i -ita =.06). 
Willingness to Share Information 
Results of the analysis of variance to test whether scientist 
subjects were le. .s willing to share information were insignificant. 
TABLE 1 
32 
Analysis of Variance of Ratings of the Three Message Versions on each 
of the Dependent Measure Scales 
Scale Source SS df MS F 
1. The message states the problem precisely. 
Lay versus Scientist 15. 21 1 15. 21 k. 33 
Message type 2. 07 2 1 ,  .03 0 .  29 
Interaction 22. ,k2 2 11, .21 3. 19 
Error 295. 20 8*+ 3. 51 
2. The message contains enough factual evidence to form an opinion 
about the problem. 
Lay versus Scientist 18. 68 1 18. 68 5. 01 
Message type 6. 07 2 3. 03 0. 81 
Interaction lk, .96 2 7. ,k8 2. 01 
Error 313. 20 8k 3. 73 
3. The message states the problem logically. 
Lay versus Scientist 9 .3^ 1 9. 3k 3. .02 
Message type 1 .87 2 0. 93 0. .30 
Interaction 5 .^3 2 2. 71 0. 88 
Error 260 .27 8k 3. 10 
The problem mentioned in the message is complex. 
Lay versus Scientist 1. .60 1 1. 60 0.78 
Message type 1. .87 2 0. 93 0.^5 
Interaction 1. 87 2 0. 93 0.^5 
Error 173. 07 8k 2. 06 
5. The source of the evidence used in the message is an authority on 
the subject of acid rain. 
Lay versus Scientist 25.60 1 25.60 9.73* 
Message type 5.^9 2 2.7^+ 1.04 
Interaction 7-2.7 2 3.63 1.38 
Error 220.93 8k 2.63 
the source of the evidence used in the message 
Lay versus Scientist 21.51 1 21.51 8.27* 
Message type 5.76 2 2.88 1.11 
Interaction 1.16 2 k.08 1.57 
Error 218.53 8k 2.60 
TABLE 1 (Continued) 
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Scale Source SS df MS 
7. Before reading the message, I thought acid rain was a major problem. 
Lay versus Scientist 67 .60 1 67 .60 3k .02 
Message type 4 .82 2 2 .41 1 .21 
Interaction 1 .27 2 0 .63 0 .31 
Error 166 .93 84 1 .99 
message explains the probl em. 
Lay versus Scientist 7 .51 1 7 .51 2 .48 
Message type 7 .36 2 3 .68 1 .21 
Interaction 38 .42 2 19 .21 6 .34 
Error 254 .67 84 3 .03 
9. I think the message contains the kind of evidence used in technical-
journal (as opposed to popular magazine) articles. 
Lay versus Scientist 44. 10 1 44, .10 18. .02 
Message type 22. 69 2 11, .34 4. 64 
interaction 12. .60 2 6, .30 2. 57 
Error 205. 60 84 2. 45 
10.The problem mentioned in the message is solvable. 
Lay versus Scientist 26. 18 1 26. 68 11.77 
Message type 1. 62 2 0. 81 0.36 
Interaction 3. 36 2 1. 68 0.74 
Error 190. 4o 84 2. .27 
11.The message states the problem objectively 
Lay versus Scientist 0.18 














12.The message presents a strong argument for linking increased sulphur 
emissions with increased acid rain. 
Lay versus Scientist 20 .5^ 1 20.54 6. 08 
Message type 1 .42 2 0.71 0. 21 
Interaction 25 .16 2 12.58 3. 72 
Error 283 .87 84 3.38 
TABLE 1 (Continued) 
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Scale Source SS df MS F 
13«The evidence presented in the message is relevant to the problem. 
Lay versus Scientist 0.44 1 o.kk 0.02 
Massage type 0.29 2 0.1k 0.16 
Interaction 3.76 2 1.89 0.84 
Err or 187.20 8k 2.23 
Ik. After reading the message, I think acid rain is a major problem. 
Lay versus Scientist O.kk 1 O.kk 0.02 
Message type 5.96 2 2.98 1.66 
Interaction W.96 2 •4.98 2.78 
Error 150.27 8k 1.79 
15. Overall, the message states the problem in a scientific way. 
Lay versus Scientist 57.60 1 57.60 18.97 
Message type 5.09 2 2.54 0.84 
Interaction 8.87 2 4.43 1.46 
Error 255.07 8k 3.0k 
16. I know the rules for scientific decision -making. 
Lay versus Scientist 84.10 1 84.10 33.75 
Message type 6.69 2 3.34 1.34 
Interaction 4.20 2 2.10 0.84 
Error 209.33 8k 2.49 
17.The only reason I know these rules is because applying them is 
part of my current job. 
Lay versus Scientist 69.34 1 69. 34 20. 03 
Message type 1.4o 2 0. 70 0. ,20 
Interaction 9.36 2 4. 68 1. 35 
Error 290.80 84 3. 46 
18.1 believe in sharing information with people in occupations 
different from my own. 
Lay versus Scientist 4 .90 1 4, .90 2.54 
Message type 1 . 62 2 0. 81 0.42 
Interaction 0 .47 2 0. 23 0.12 
Error 162 .13 84 1. .93 
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TABLE 1 (Continued) 
Scale Source SS df MS F 
19»Number of favorable words reflecting opinion about the prospect 
of solving the problem that the mess*-».c;e describes. 
Lay versus Scientist 7. 51 1 7. 51 3. • 38 
Message type 0. 96 2 0. 48 0. 22 
Interaction 2. 32 2 1. 41 0. 64 
Error 186. 67 84 2, .22 
20.Ratio of favorable to unfavorable v/ords reflecting opinion about 
the prospect of solving the problem that the message describes. 
Lay versus Scientist 5. 01 1 5. 01 3. 48 
Message type 2. 87 2 1. 44 1. 00 
Interaction 2. 62 2 1. 31 0. 91 
Error 120, .93 84 1, .44 
21.Number of words listed that describe scientific communication. 
Lay versus Scientist 48. 40 1 48. 4o 5. 08 
Message type 2. 02 2 1 .  01 0. ,11 
Interaction 6. 07 2 3, .03 0 ,  .32 




Mean Ratings of Lay Versus Scientist of the Three Message Veroiono 
on each of the Dependent Measure Scales 
n = 15 per cell 
Message Versions 
Irrelevant No Relevant 
Scale Numbers Numbers Numbers 
1. The message states the problem precisely. 
Lay 4.53 3-73 3.87 
Scientist 2.33 3.87 3-47 
2. The message contains enough factual ovidence to form an opinion 
about the problem. 
Lay 4.40 3.kO 4.67 
Scientist 2.67 3-60 3»^7 
3. The message states the problem logically. 
Lay 4.47 4.47 3.94 
Scientist 3-20 3*87 3.87 
4. The problem mention in the message is complex. 
Lay 6.07 3.80 6.13 
Scientist 5.93 6.33 6.33 
5. The source of the evidence used in the message is an authority on 
the subject of acid rain. 
Lay 4.07 3.13 3.67 
Scientist 2.20 2.40 3*07 
6. I trust the source of the evidence used in the message. 
Lay 4.4-0 3' 60 3 »73 
Scientist 2.73 2.53 3-53 
7. Before reading the message, I thought acid rain was a major problem. 
Lay 4.87 4.07 4.53 
Scientist 6.27 6.00 6.40 
Critical Difference (Scheff£) = 1.72 for significant interaction. 
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TABLE 2 (Continued) 
Message Versions 
Irrelevant No Relevant 
Scale Numbers Numbers Numbers 
8. The message explains the problem. 
Lay 4.87 , 4.07 4.00 
Scientist 2.4-7 4.67 4.07 
9. I think the message contains the kind of evidence used in technical-
journal (as opposed to popular magazine) articles. 
Lay 2.87 2.93 4.67 
Scientist I.67 2.33 2.27 
10.The problem mentioned in the message is solvable. 
Lay 4.40 4.67 5.13 
Scientist 6.00 5.67 5.80 
11.The message states the problem objectively. 
Lay 3.93 3.93 4.0 
Scientist 3.87 3.67 4.60 
12.The message presents a strong argument fgr linking increased sulphur 
dioxide emissions with increased acid rain. 
Lay 5.33 4.67 4.07 
Scientist 3*27 3.40 4.53 
13. The evidence presented in the message is relevant to the problem. 
Lay 5-53 3.00 4.87 
Scientist 4.80 5«33 5.20 
k Critical Difference (Scheffe) = 1.60 for significant interaction. 
C Critical Difference (Scheffe) = 1.01 for significant main effect. 
^ Critical Difference (Scheffe) = 1.68 for significant interaction. 
TABLE 2 (Continued) 
38 
Message Versions 
Irrelevant No Relevant 
Scale Numbers Numbers Numbers 
14. After reading the message, I think acid rain is a major problem. 
Lay 5-57 5.4-7 5.60 
Scientist 4.73 6.13 5.73 
15. Overall, the message states the problem in a scientific way. 
Lay 3.93 3.53 4.67 
Scientist 2.07 2.80 2.47 
16. I know the rules for scientific decision-making. 
Lay 3.67 3-13 4.27 
Scientist 5»l+^ 5*67 5-80 
17. The only reason I know these rules is because applying them is 
part of my current job. 
Lay 2.87 2.93 2.47 
Scientist 4.13 4.27 5.13 
18. I believe in sharing information with people in occupations 
different from my own. 
Lay 6.20 6.13 5.73 
Scientist 6.53 6.53 6.40 
19. Number of favorable, words reflecting opinion about the prospect 
of solving the problem that the message describes. 
Lay 1.87 1.87 1.40 
Scientist O.87 1.27 1.27 
20. Ratio of favorable to unfavorable words reflecting opinion about 
the prospect of solving the problem that the message describes. 
Lay 1.78 1.7^ 1.25 
Scientist O.83 1.44 1.08 
21. Number of words listed that describe scientific communication. 
Lay 3.60 3.27 3.20 
Scientist 4.40 5.33 4.73 
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Percent of Variance Explained by Significant Differences between Ratings 
of the Three Message Versions by Lay and Scientist Subjects on each of 
the Dependent Measure Scales 
Scale Source E2 
1. The message states the problem precisely. 
Lay versus Scientist .04 
Interaction .07 
2. The message contains enough factual evidence to form an opinion 
about the problem. 
Lay versus Scientist .05 
5. The source of the evidence used in the message is an authority on 
the subject of acid rain. 
Lay versus Scientist .10 
6. I trust the source of the evidence used in the message. 
Lay versus Scientist .08 
7. Before reading the message, I thought acid rain was a major problem. 
Lay versus Scientist .28 
8. The message explains the problem. 
Interaction .12 
9. I think the message contains the kind of evidence used in technical-
journal (as opposed to popular magazine) articles. 
Lay versus Scientist .15 
Message Type .003 
10.The problem mentioned in the message is solvable. 
Lay versus Scientist .12 
12.The message presents a strong argument for linking increased sulphur 
dioxide emissions with increased acid rain. 
Lay versus Scientist .06 
Interaction .08 
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TABLE 3 (Continued) 
Scale Source E2 
15.Overall, the message states the problem in a scientific way. 
Lay versus Scientist .18 
16.1 know the rules for scientific decision-making. 
Lay versus Scientist .28 
17.The only reason I know these rules is because applying them is part 
of ray job. 
Lay versus Scientist .19 
21.Number of words listed that describe scientific communication. 
Lay versus Scientist .06 
kz 
In summary then, the majority of the significant results found 
in the analysis of the entire questionnaire are due to differences in 
the two populations sampled, with the scientist subjects, in general, 
evaluating the message negatively and the lay subjects tending to 
have no opinion. As indicated by the disordinal interactions, the 
scientist and lay subjects differed particularly in their response to 
the irrelevant numbers version of the message. The effects of 
quantification in the three message versions (relevant numbers, irrel­
evant numbers, and no numbers) were insignificant except for the 
technical-journal like evidence question. 
Factor Structure of the Questionnaire 
A factor analysis was computed for heuristic purposes, to see 
what factors tended to emerge out of th? various scales. The Principal 
Components Factor Analysis with Varima>: Orthogonal Rotations was 
used. A four factor solution was obtained. 
'As shown in Table 4, the first factor is best identified by 
precision, logicality, and explanation, those variables which loaded 
highest on this factor but not at all highly on the other factors. 
Other unambiguous variables contributing to this factor included 
relevance of evidence and thinking acid rtin was a problem after 
reading the message. We could call this factor Scientific Process 
since it seems to pertain to characteristics of scientific inquiry. 
Factor two contained the highest loadings for scales measuring 
confidence in knowing the rules for scientific decisionmaking, thinking 
acid rain was a problem prior to reading the message, and problem 
solvability. Since this factor was loaded on most heavily by knowing 
the rules for scientific decisionmaking, we could call it Professional 
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Background. 
Factor three was loaded on most heavily by authoritativeness of 
the message source and by trustworthiness of the message source 
(although loadings were somewhat ambiguous on this scale). Con­
sequently, we could describe this factor as pertaining to the 
credibility and, in particular, the authoritativeness of the source. 
Factor four was loaded on most hsavily by the scales measuring 
whether the problem was stated in a scientific way, whether it contained 
technical-journal like evidence, and by objectivity. ^hile all 
three variables were ambiguous (i.e., unclear differentiation of 
primary and secondary loadings), this factor could be described as 
pertaining to the message characteristics of the scientific product 
or report. 
TABLE 4 
Simplified Factor Matrix Showing Primary and Secondary Loadings of the 
Dependent Measure Scales 
Variable 
Factor 

































TABLE k (Continued) 
Variable Factor 
II III IV 
current thoughts about problem .59 








Qualitative Categories Associated with Scientific Communication 
To gain insight into ways scientist and lay subjects characterize 
science, subjects were requested to list words illustrative of 
differences between scientific and nonscientific communication. 
Scientists listed significantly more concepts than did lay subjects. 
After data were collected, words or concepts listed by the subjects 
were written on blank cards, one word on concept per card. Frequencies 
of words that were mentioned more than once were noted separately but 
duplicate words were not included in the deck. Frequencies were not 
mentioned to the two judges. Two judges familiar with qualitative 
methodology were asked to sort the cards independently, clustering 
similar qualities into categories and then generating descriptive 
labels to describe those qualities. Judfoe A initially created six main 
categories while Judge B created thirteen. 
After this sorting procedure was completed, the researcher collapsed 
both judges' categories into a final set of three categories to form maxi­
mum convergence between judges (see Appendix C). As a measure of 
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correlation between the two judges, Cohen's Coefficient of Agreement 
was computed, which indicated a .69 index of reliability. 
The first category could be called Process since it pertains to 
procedures for scientific decisionmaking and adjudication. Judge 
A described this category as "Truth, objectivity, unbiased and unemo­
tional, logical presentation and sense of purpose and importance for 
mankind." In Judge B's terminology, the category includes "Logical 
argumentation, rules of inference, objectivity, orderliness and con-
creteness. ^ithin this category, 128 of the total 191 words listed 
were listed by scientists and 63 by lay subjects. To adjust for the 
fact that scientist subjects listed significantly more words, the 
ratio of number in the category/total numbers listed for all categories 
was computed. It was seen that scientist subjects included 68 
percent of their total words in this c<?te%ory while lay subjects 
included *+9. percent. For both subject populations then, half or more 
of the words generated pertained to the idea of science as process. 
If category one is Process, something whose procedures are known 
by an "in group," then category two could best be characterized as 
Product. In Judge A's terminology, it is "an outcome referred to by 
an 'out group,' which perceives the product of science as confusing, 
difficult, and unnecessarily dull." Judge A also noted that such 
characteristics lead some to experience a loss of faith in the product 
and for others to express belief in a painstaking and methodical 
product. In Judge B's words, this category is characterized by "elitism, 
mystification, tedium, paraphenalia, pragmatism, and physical science 
terms." Within this category, ^9 of the total words were listed by 
scientists and 56 by lay subjects. In terms of percentages, the 
scientists included 26 percent of their words in this category whereas 
the lay subjects included bk percent. 
The third category was Quantification or Measurement. although 
the category was a fairly small one, it does seem to have several 
distinguishing characteristics. The words listed in this category— 
words like "statistics," "numbers," and "numerical" and "quantitative" 
—were more frequently mentioned by subjects than words in the other 
two categories. Within this category scientists included 12 words and 
lay subjects included 9» -^or both subjects 6 percent of their total 
words were included in this category. 
CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION 
The review of the literature in Chapter 1 showed that quantif­
ication was a norm for scientific communication and that it affected 
attitude change and perceived problem solvability for lay subjects. 
Whether these results could be generalized to scientists as well as to 
lay subjects had not been studied in the prior research. Nor was it 
clear whether previous results were due to the mere presence of 
numbers or to the specificity of the evidence and arguments presented. 
Finally, the literature review showed that there was a derth of 
information on ways in which scientist and lay subjects conceptualize 
or think about science. 
To clarify these questions, five hypotheses were advanced. 
This chapter discusses the tests of the hypotheses as well as their 
implications. 
Tests of Hypotheses 
The first hypothesis stated, 
Scientist and lay subjects will perceive messages with 
numbers as having greater scientificity than messages 
without numbers. 
The results of the analysis of variance showed that, except for the 
questionnaire item that asked if the message contained technical-
journal like evidence (Item 9)1 the null hypothesis regarding the rela­
tionship between message version and message evaluation could not be 
rejected. '^he main effect for the technical-journal question revealed 
that the relevant numbers message version was evaluated significantly 
k 7 
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higher than the other two versions. The only other significant 
differences involving message type were significant disordinal inter­
actions for the scaled items about precision (Item l), whether the 
message explained the problem (Item 8), and whether it established a 
causal link (Item 12). These interactions were attributable to the 
scientists' disdain for the irrelevant numbers message. 
Although significant differences between the message types were 
found on only a few scales, the scales intended to measure perceived 
scientificity did intercorrelate highly with each other and very lowly 
\ 
with the other scale items. 
The second hypothesis stated, 
Message version will affect lay and scientist subjects' 
predisposition favorable to finding solution. 
The results of the analysis of variance showed that the null hypothesis 
pertaining to the relationship between problem solvability and quanti­
fication in messages could not be rejected. Of the dependent measures 
pertinent to this hypothesis, the only significant differences were 
between scientist and lay subjects, with the scientists agreeing 
significantly more that acid rain was a problem (Item ?) and that 
it was a solvable problem (Item 10). Perceived complexity (Item 4) 
was not, however, evaluated differently by the two populations. All 
significant differences were due to tie populations sampled, not to 
the messages. However, whether scientists would hold the same 
opinion about problems other than acid riin is not clear. 
The present study did not replicate the Witt study. Failure to 
replicate Witt's study could be due to variance in the present study 
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added by using a non-neutral topic. However, it could be argued that 
the low intercorrelation between prior opinion on whether acid rain 
was a problem and all other scales indicates that prior opinion was 
not an' important factor in the results. Failure to replicate could also 
be due to differences in instructional set. Since Witt's article 
failed to include the instructions to subjects that accompanied his 
list of words, it it possible that the present study suggested a 
different instructional set for responses to the word list. 
Hypothesis three stated, 
Subjects' perceptions of the authoritativeness of the 
message source will be affected by the presence or absence 
of numbers in the messages but their perceptions of the 
trustworthiness of the message source will not be so 
affected. 
Results of the analysis of variance indicate that the null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected. Again, message version had no effect on subject 
perceptions of trustworthiness (Item 6) and authoritativeness (Item 5)-
However, there were significant differences between lay and scientist 
subjects on the two scaled items, with scientists tending to distrust 
and doubt the authoritativeness of the message source. 
However, given that McCroskey's studies (19&6, 1967* 1970) 
indicated that it was authoritativeness that was most affected by evidence, 
it is interesting to note that on the factor analysis, it was the 
authoritativeness variable which most strongly characterized the 
third factor, Credibility. 
Hypothesis four stated, 
Scientist subjects will have stronger opinions about science 
than will lay subjects. 
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Results of the analysis of variance indicated that the null hypothesis 
could, in this case, be rejected. Scientist subjects were, not 
surprisingly, significantly more confident of their knowledge than lay 
subjects (Item 16). The comparatively low intercorrelations between 
the knowing-the-rules and only-knowing-them-because-it-is-part-of-my-
job (Item 1?) scales could be taken to indicate that the scientist's 
confidence in their knowledge of rules for science does not come 
from their jobs, but rather that it coiaP3 from their disciplines. 
Scientists also generated significantly more words than did lay subjects 
to illustrate differences between scientific and nonscientific 
communication. 
Hypothesis five stated, 
Scientist subjects will be less willing to disseminate infor­
mation than will lay subjects. 
Results of the analysis of variance indicate that the null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected. N0 significant differences between scientist and 
lay subjects were found on the scaled question about willingness to 
share information (Item l8). 
This is puzzling since the literature indicates that the closed 
communication system of the discipline is crucial to the doing of 
contemporary science. In conjunction, another surprising result of 
the qualitative section of the present study was that few of the 
concepts generated by the scientists pertained to what Judge B called 
"Community of colleagues" and Judge k referred to as the "in group." 
A possibility is that the lack of results in this area is due to an 
the scaled item's having tapped a cultural truism. Or that the insignifi­
cant result is due to a population artifact. One of the researcher's 
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collaborators in gathering data, for example, is the Central Region 
Coordinator for the -Environmental Impact Analysis Office of the U.S. 
Geological Survey. Certainly, in impact analysis, there is a kind 
Df imperative for interdisciplinary communication. An alternative 
explanation, of course is that the scaled opinion question does not 
measure the subtlety of the disciplinary control of information. 
Implications 
In this section implications of the tests of hypotheses will be 
considered in conjunction with the results of the qualitative inquiry. 
Before preceding, it would be useful to reiterate some of the major 
conclusions that can be drawn from Chanter l's discussion of different 
ideas of science. First, there are many ideas and no consensus as 
to what science consists of. Second, a fairly common view, for both 
scientist and presumably lay subjects, is the logical-empiricist 
view of science or some version of it, which emphasizes the truth 
and validity of scientific knowledge. Third, virtually nothing is 
known about how lay subjects characterize or conceptualize science. 
Before discussion of the specific qualities which subjects asso­
ciated with science, it is interesting to note that while the researcher 
asked for words and phrases illustrating differences between scientific 
and nonscientific communication, what she got?'back ((3% for scientist 
and ̂ 9 % for lay sub jects) were words and phrases illustrative of 
the process of doinp; science. Perhaps the subjects, particularly the 
scientists, regarded scientific communication as more substantive, 
an integral part of the doing of science. 
Returning to the vocabulary of the first chapter, the first major 
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category found among the subjects' lists of words about science was 
•Process, which could also be referred to as btory: words within this 
category are illustrative of ideas about what constitutes a good 
science story. 1'he second major category, Product, could be referred 
to as Message: words within this category are illustrative of ideas 
about what makes a message or report scientific. 
Keeping these distinctions in mind, it is interesting to note 
that scientists listed more words representative of the Story or 
Process category, and lay subjects listed more words in the Product 
or Message category. Th.us, we could take the Story category as 
exemplifying how the scientists conceptualized science and the Message 
category as exemplifying how the lay subjects conceptualized science. 
After discussion of some of the pertinent characteristics of 
the categories in conjunction with the literature review presented 
earlier, this section will examine ways in which credibility seems to 
be operating for both categories, and, finally, discuss the nature 
of the relationship between these two mammoth categories and the tiny 
but clear-cut Quantification category. 
Process and Story 
In chapter one, it was noted that scientific knowledge is no 
longer regarded as having deductive certainty. In overwhelming numbers, 
both lay and scientist subjects listed words that reflect the idea 
that scientific knowledge is certain. In the words of one respondent: 
science is "accurate, true, and right;" in the words of another, 
"science ain't fuzzy." While there were a few scientists who listed 
words like "qualitative" and "inductive" and "attenpted objectivity", 
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they were in the minority. For the subjects in this study, science 
is more than a useful problem-solving model: it leads to Truth. 
It is interesting to note that "elitist," "pretentious," and 
"insensitive" were the most pejorative words that lay subjects listed. 
At no time did they seem to be questioning the "accurate, true, and 
right" idea of science. As will be shown in the discussion of the 
second category, Product or Message, lay subjects seem more bemused 
than anything else about science. 
Another interesting characteristic of the Process category is 
the prevalence of terms pertaining to reasoning and rules for inference 
and argumentation over terms pertaining to empiricism, observation, and 
data. This is particularly interesting since Geology and Engineering, 
the disciplines from which the scientist-subjects were drawn, 
are "hard" sciences. For the scientists, very few respondents listed 
terms like "exhausting" (i.e., conducting research is exhausting). This 
lack of personal responses perhaps indicates that scientists re trained 
to think about science in the generalised terms of the hypothetico-de-
ductive model of science, not in terms of their own personal experience 
with the complicated process of data gathering. 
Product and Message 
This category, which contained the greatest percentage of lay 
words, focused on nonsubstantive aspects of the message. As was 
mentioned previously, little to nothing has been done to investigate 
how lay people respond to science, beyond to say that some lay 
people have faith in science and others do not. It is interesting 
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to note that lay subjects seemed clearly overwhelmed and confused 
by "big words," "Latin words," "science words," "large words ,""vo­
cabulary," "wordy," and "detail." The effect of the seemingly alien 
vocabulary—as well as "more sources," "footnotes," "figures," 
"diagrams," "charts,1.1 "graphs," "symbols," and "dates"—was to produce 
both a sense of efficacy for humankind as well as mystification and 
tedium. 
It' is interesting to note that, on the factor analysis, two 
variables, objectivity and stating the problem in a scientific way, 
were ambiguous in the factor loadings bet-een what we are now calling 
the Story and Message categories.- Thus, it would seem that both the 
message format and the story form somehow affect credibility. Tt 
is then both belief in the method of science and the methodical 
empirical writing and technical-journal publication style that 
inspires faith. Interestingly, authoritativeness intercorrelated 
most highly with the causality and stating-it-in-a-scientific-way 
scales, whereas trustworthiness intercorrelated most highly with the 
evidence-like-a-technical-journal and stating-it-in-a-scientific-way 
scales. 
Quantification: a Message or a Story Variable? 
Examining the results of the analyses of variance, the factor 
analysis, and the qualitative sorting en masse raises the following 
question: Is quantification most closely associated with the -Product 
(Message) or the Process (Story) categories derived in the qualitative 
sorting and the factor analysis? Although differences between scientist 
and lay subjects for the irrelevant nuirbers version of the message were 
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not significant on all scales, examination, of the means table 
indicates a similar pattern for all nin^ of the scales measuring 
scientific qualities of the messages. Scientists • reacted negatively to 
the irrelevant numbers version. An example of this is one scientist's 
objection to the irrelevant numbers message version, as illustrated 
by comments like "what next? rainas acidic as ice cream?". The 
lay subjects, however, reacted about the same as they did to the 
relevant numbers version of the message. 
The scientists' negative response to the irrelevant numbers 
version could be interpreted as indicating that scientists regard 
quantification as part of their domain, that it is part of the 
process of doing science. When quantification is used appropriately 
it may not necessarily be rewarded, but it most certainly will not 
trigger a negative evaluation. Quantification then, at least 
for scientists, seems a story component. 
For lay subjects, however, quantification seems to reside more 
in the product or message category. Lay subjects usually responded 
equivalently to the irrelevant and rlevant message versions. 
-^urther, the difference between respont.es to the irrelevant numbers 
version by lay and scientist subjects could be taken to indicate that, 
not knowing the underlying rules for science, the lay subjects do not 
see the violation of the rule. In the one case where lay subjects 
were significantly more favorable to the relevant numbers version, it could 
be argued that they were influenced by the presence of measurement 
terms like "tonnes/year." This seems possible since the paraphenalia of 
technical communication—words, symbols, diagrams, etc.—figures so 
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heavily in the Product category and since the one significant scale 
for main effect most represented the Product factor on the factor 
matrix (factor four). 
In summary then, the role of quantification seems a complex one. 
Quantification seems to play a different role for scientist and lay 
subjects. The present study has extended the previous literature 
by l) showing that quantification functions differently for lay 
and scientist subjects; 2^ that scientist and lay subjects tend to 
conceptualize science differently; and J>) that for both groups, 




June 30* 1980 
As part of my M.A. thesis at the University of Montana, I am studying some 
variables rel&"ted to written communication. To answer my research questions, 
I have condensed a 200-word message on acid rain from previous studies. 
Since the messages in previous studies were rated by a diversified group 
of people, I, too, need a diversified group to rate my 200-word message. 
All I nsed you to do is to read the attached message and then rate it 
by answering the questions that folio1*. There are no "right" or "wrong" 
answers. I am particularly interested in your acting as a critic for me, 
in your telling me whether the quantity and quality of the evidence 
included in the message is sufficient. 
I would greatly appreciate your help (this will not take any more than 
10 minutes of your time). Please do not discuss your responses with 
anyone until you have finished the task. I need your response—which 
will be anonymous—by mid July- Again, thank you for the help! 
Sincerely, 
Claudia Krenz 
Department of Interpersonal 
Communication 
•PLEASE READ TIIE FOLLOWING MESSAGE CAREFULLY* 
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MESSAGE 
For the world's inhabitants, particularly those around the Atlantic 
Ocean, acid rain has been labeled a major environmental problem associated 
with fossil fuel combustion. Although fuels derived from coal add 1.2 
to 2.8 times more carbon/unit than conventional fossil fuels, it is overall 
fossil-fuel use that is problematic. Human activities are adding sulphur 
dioxide to the atmosphere and thereby increasing rain's acidity (indicated 
by lower scale positions) beyond its norm of 5«7» 
Until mid century, European sulphur dioxide emissions were fairly 
constant (about 25 million tonnes). In the past decade, they have increased 
3-fold to about 70 million tonnes. Canada's current emissions are now 
about the same as Britain's (about 5 million tonnes), but the United 
States' are about 5 times that. 
Last decade, on an uneventful spring day, rain in a storm over Scotland 
was as acidic as vinegar (2.4), the worst recording ever. In the eastern 
United States, rainfall's average acidity (now between 4.0 and 4.5) has 
dramatically increased since mid century- Some rainfall now is as acidic 
as lemon juice, over 100 times above normal. Already, acid rain has been 
recorded in the following areas: Los Angeles, San Francisco, Seattle, and 
the Rocky Mountains. 
*PLEASE READ THE FOLLt WING MESSAGE CAREFULLY* 
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MESSAGE 
For the world's inhabitants, particularly those living on both sides 
of the Atlantic Ocean, acid rain has been labeled as a very serious 
global environmental problem that is associated with fossil fuel combus­
tion. Although synthetic gas and synthetic oil derived from coal add 
more carbon/unit to the atmosphere than do conventional fossil fuels, 
it is the overall use of all fossil fuels that is problematic. Human 
activities are adding to the sulphur dioxide in the atmosphere and 
thereby increasing the acidity of rain. 
Until mid century, sulphur dioxide emission rates in Europe were 
fairly constant. In the past decade, these rates have increased dra­
matically. Canada's current emission rates are now about the same 
as Britain's, but the United States' are much higher, although not so 
high as those in Europe. 
Last decade, on an otherwise normal, uneventful spring day, the rain 
in a storm over Scotland was as acidic as vinegar, the worst recording 
ever made. In the eastern United States, the average rainfall has become 
dramatically more acidic since mid century. Some rainfall now is as 
acidic as lemon juice. Already, acid rain has been recorded in the 
following areas: Los Angeles, San Francisco, Seattle, and the Rocky 
Mountains. 
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* PLEASE READ THE FOLLCJIIIG MESSAGE CAREFULLY * 
MESSAGE 
For the world's 3 billion inhabitants, particularly for those on 
the 2 sides of the Atlantic Ocean, acid rain has been labeled as 1 of 
6 major environmental problems associated with fossil-fuel combustion. 
Although fuels derived from coal add more carbon/unit than do conven­
tional fossil fuels, it is the cumulative effect of 100% of all use 
that is problematic. Human activities are adding to the sulphur 
dioxide in the atmosphere and thereby increasing the acidity of rain. 
Until the first 30 years of this century had passed, Europe's sulphur 
dioxide emissions were fairly constant. In the past decade or 10 years, 
they have increased dramatically. Canada's annual emission rates are 
now similar to Britain's, but the United States' are much higher. 
although not so high as Europe's. 
About 10 years ago, on an otherwise uneventful April 10th, rain in 
a storm over Scotland was as acidic as vinegar, the worst recording 
ever. In the eastern 1/2 of the United States, the average rainfall has 
become dramatically more acidic since the 1950s. Some rainfall now 
is as acidic as lemon juice. Already, acid rain has been recorded in 
the 4 following areas: Los Angeles, ^an Francisco, Seattle, and the 
Rocky Mountains. 
QUESTIONNAIRE 62 
After reading the message, please indicate your opinion about the questions 
and statements that follow. There are no "right" and "wrong" answers 
I am interested in your first opinion (your initial assessment) so please 
do not refer back to the message . 
* * * * *  
PLEASE UNDERLINE EACH WORD "THAT REFLECTS YOUR OPINION ABOUT THE PROSPECT 































PLEASE ACT AS A CRITIC BY RATING THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS (MOSTLY ABOUT 
THE KIND OF EVIDENCE INCLUDED IN THE MESSAGE). PLEASE RESPOND TO EACH 
STATEMENT INDIVIDUALLY AND INDICATE YOUR OPINION BY CIRCLING THE APPROPRIATE 

















1. The message states the problem precisely. 
12 3 4 5 6 7 
2. The message contains enough factual evidence to form an opinion about 
the problem. 
12 5 4 5 6 7 
3. The message states the problem logically. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. The problem mentioned in the message is complex. 
1 2 5 4 5 6 7 
5. The source of the evidence used in the message is an authority on the 
subject of acid rain. 
12 3 4 5 6 7 
6. I trust the source of the evidence used in the message. 
I 2 5 4 5 6 7 
(continued next page) 
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7* Before reading the message, I thought acid rain was a major problem. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. The message explains the problem. 
i 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9. I think the message contains the kind cf evidence used in technical-
journal (as opposed to popular magazine) articles. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10. The problem mentioned in the message is solvable. 
12 3 4 5 6 7 
11. The message states the problem objectively. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12. The message presents a strong argument for linking increased sulphur 
dioxide emissions with increased acid rain. 
1 2 5 4 5 6 7 
13. The evidence presented in the message is relevant to the problem. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
14. After reading the message, I think acid rain is a major problem. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
15. Overall, the message states the problem in a scientific way. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
16. I know the rules for scientific decision-making. 
1 2 5 4 5 6 7 
17- The only reason I know these rules is because applying them is part 
of my current job. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
l8. I believe in sharing information with people in occupations different 
from my own. 
1 2 5 4 5 6 7 
(continued next page) 
* * * * * * * *  6 4  
OFF THE TOP OF YOUR HEAD, LIST \S MANY WORDS AS YCU CAII TIIAT IILUSTRATE 
WAYS IN WHICH SCIENTIFIC COMMUNICATION IS DIFFERENT FROM NGrsCIZIiTIFIC 
COMMUNICATION. 
PLEASE RESPOND TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS BY FILLING IN THE BLANKS. 
My occupation is . 
My main job activity (management, teaching,clerical,research, etc.) is 
• 
My highest academic degree (if any) is . 
Date conferred: . 
Discipline or subject: . 
If currently a student, circle class: freshman sophomore junior senior 
and list major: . 






Demographic Information about Scientist Subjects Receiving the Irrele-r 
ant Numbers Version of the Message 
Dis­
cipline 
Degrees and Pates they were 



















a B = Bachelors degree; M = Masters degree; D = Doctoral degree, 
k Parenthesized number indicates frequency of response. 
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TABLE 2 
Demographic Information about Scientist Subjects Receiving the No 
Numbers Version of the Message 
Dis­
cipline 
Degrees and Dates they were 
Receiveda Main Job Activitie; 

















aB = Bachelors degree; M = Masters degree; D = Doctoral degree. 
^Parenthesized numbers indicates frequency of response. 
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TABLE Z 
Demographic Information about Scientist Subjects Receiving the Relevant 
Numbers Version of the Message 
Dis­
cipline 
Degrees and Dates they were 
Received Main Job Activities 









Map compilation; research 
EIS preparation; research 
Research (2); research and 
management 
a B = Bachelors degree; M = Masters degree; D = Doctoral degree. 
^ Parenthesized numbers indicates frequency of response. 
Appendix C 
APPENDIX C 
Words Generated by Subjects on which Judges 
Agreed after Collapsing Categories 
Judge Word Source 
Judge A Judge B Scientist Lay Word Final Category 
Underlying Depth k Breadth 1 far reaching Product 
Sense of Depth & Breadth 1 goals 
Efficacy Depth Breadth 1 informative 
Depth Breadth 1 understanding 
Elitism 1 knowledge 
Outcome Mystification 5 7 technical 
Mystification 1 verbosity 
Mystification 1 1 wordy 
Tedium 1 time 
Paraphenalia 1 vocabulary 
Paraphenalia 1 science terms 
Breadth & Depth 1 depth 
Loss of Paraphenalia 1 name dropping to spread out the blame 
Faith Paraphenalia 1 literature background 
Paraphenalia 1 author stated with credentials 
Paraphenalia 
k 
1 more sources 
Paraphenalia 1 references 
Paraphenalia 1 footnotes 
Paraphenalia 2 sources 
Pragmatism 1 pragmatism 
Pragmatism 1 interest 
Depth & Breadth 1 1 involved 
Depth & Breadth b 2 detail 
APPENDIX £ (Continued) 
Judge 
Judge A Judge B 
Word Source 
Scientist Lay Word Final Category 
Tedium 1 laborious 
Elitism 1 1 educated • 
Comm. Colleagues 1 peer review 
Comm. Colleagues 1 peers 
Depth & Breadth 1 exhausting 
Vaguely Per­ Paraphenalia 1 figures 
ceived Paraphenalia 1 diagrams 
Distinguish­ Paraphenalia 1 charts 
ing Modes of Paraphenalia 1 dates 
of Pre­ Paraphenalia 1 abbreviations 
sentation Paraphenalia 1 symbols 
Paraphenalia 1 symbols like pH 
Paraphenalia 2 graphs 
Physical Sci. Ter, » 1 DNA 
Physical Sci. Ter, • 1 chemical compounds 
Physical Sci. Ter, » 1 biological 
Physical Sci. Ter, i 1 sodium potassium 
Physical Sci. Ter. 1 nitrate 
Confusing, Mystification i difficult vocabulary 
Difficult, Mystification 2 confusing 
Unnecessar­ Mystification 1 complex 
ily Dull Mystification 1 3 complicated 
Mystif ication 1 ambiguous 
Mystification 1 bad syntax 
Mystification 2 v.,ig words 
Mystification 1 longer explanations 
APPENDIX C (Continued) 
Judge Word Source 
Judge A Judge B Scientist Lay Word Final Category 
Tedium 1 dull 
Mystification 1 long, fact filled sentences 
Mystification 1 formal language 
Tedium 1 boring 
Tedium 1 1 dry 
Elitism 1 educated guess 
Elitism 1 elitist 
Elitism 1 erudite 
Comm. Colleagues 1 geared toward a specific group 
Tedium 1 insensitive 
Elitism 1 pretentious 
Paraphenalia 1 1 language 
Mystification 1 Latin words 
Mystification 1 large words 
Mystification 5 3 jargon 
Mystification 1 not clear 
Mystification 1 technical jargon 
Process, Objectivity 1 
in group Objectivity 2 
Objectivity 3 2 
Objectivity 1 
Objectivity 1 
Objectivity 8 5 
Objectivity 1 
Objectivity 1 
Logical Argumen. .1 2 
Logical rirgunen. 1 










APFENDIX C (Continued) 
Judge 
Judge A Judge B 
Word Source 
Scientist Lay Word Final Category 
Logical Argumen. 1 explanation 
Logical Argumen. 1 interpretation 
Logical Argumen. 2 probability 
Logical Argumen. 2 problem statement 
Logical Argumen. 1 scientific method 
Logical Argumen. 2 1 experiment 
Logical Argumen. 1 control 
Logical Argumen. 1 cites all evidence 
Logical Argumen. 1 alternative hypotheses 
Logical Argumen. 1 1 evidence 
Logical Argumen. 1 experimental basis 
Logical Argumen. 1 experimental evidence 
Logical Argumen. 2 hypotheses 
Logical Argumen. 1 inductive 
Logical Argumen. 1 monitor 
Logical Argumen. 1 multiple hypotheses 
Logical .Argumen. 1 nomological-deductive 
Logical Argumen. 1 observation 
Logical Argumen. 1 observed effects 
Logical Argumen. 1 presents all evidence 
Logical Argumen. 1 variables 
Logical Argumen. 1 repeatable 
Logical Argumen. 2 2 research 
Logical Argumen. 3 2 tested 
Logical Argumen. 2 analysis 
Logical Argumen. 1 consideration 
Logical Argumen. 2 study 
APPENDIX C (Continued) 
Judge Word Source 














































conclusions based on weighing factual evidence 
documented 
objectivity 
objective use of objectively obtained data 
nonbiased 
avoids polemics 
appeals to objectivity 
attempted objectivity 
one meaning agreed upon by all 




























APPENDIX C (Continued) 
Judge V/ord Source 
Judge A Judge B Scientist Lay V/ord Final Category 
Objectivity 1 provable 
Objectivity 1 authentic 
Objectivity k 2 accurate 
Logical Argumen. 1 positive proof 
Logical ^rgumen. 1 2 proof 
Logical Argumen. 2 reliable 
Logical or Logical Argumen. 10 2 logic 
Logical-like Logical Argumen. 1 appeals to logic 
Presentation Orderliness 1 logical organization 
Orderliness 1 organized factual presentation 
Objectivity 1 empiricism 
Objectivity 1 descriptive 
Concreteness 1 1 concrete 
Concreteness 1 1 direct 
Concreteness 1 lucid 
Concreteness 8 7 precise 
Concreteness 1 rigor 
Concreteness l unambiguous 
Concreteness 2 clarity 
Concreteness 3 1 concise 
'Jriting that Quantification 1 2 numerical Quantification 
Used Numbers Quantification 1 2 numbers 
Quantification 1 mathematics 




'Quantification 2 statistics 
Quantification 2 statistically meaningful 
Quantification if quantitative 
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